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Introduction
Prior to the financial crisis that started in 2007, bank supervisors in the developed world had invested enormous resources in developing and implementing the capital adequacy requirements as one of their primary prudential regulatory tool. These efforts have been most evident internationally in the capital adequacy accords of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The first of these accords, widely known as Basel I, was released in July 1988 with the expectation that it would be fully implemented no later than the end of 1992 for internationally active banks (BCBS). 1 A more sophisticated system of measuring capital adequacy, called Basel II, was issued in June 2004. Yet when tested by the financial crisis that started in 2007, the Basel approaches (I and II) to capital adequacy were not enough to sustain depositor and investor confidence in many large banking organizations. To be sure, the problem was not that investors lost confidence in banks because the they were reporting low Basel capital ratios. Furlong 3 shows that large U.S.
bank holding companies (BHCs) consistently reported tier one capital ratios above 8 percent on average throughout 2007 and 2008 (versus Basel tier one requirements of four percent).
Haldane 4 finds similar results for a sample of large, internationally important financial firms in the U.S. and Europe. 5 Nevertheless, many globally important financial firms failed or required extraordinary assistance from their respective governments during the crisis including Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, American International Group (AIG), Royal Bank of Scotland, Dexia, Lloyds and Fortis. 6 After the widespread runs that followed the failure of Lehman Brothers, the U.S.
authorities turned to stress tests as a way of addressing market concerns about capital adequacy.
The U.S. Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) subjected the country's 19 largest
BHCs to a stress test. BHCs under SCAP were required to evaluate the adequacy of their capital against a "severely adverse" scenario and they were expected to retain sufficiently high capital ratios throughout the scenario to be able to continue lending to creditworthy customers. BHCs that did not pass the test were required to either issue additional capital to investors or accept a capital injection from the federal government that came with various restrictive requirements. 7 SCAP appears to have been a success as market concerns about BHC's financial conditions were reduced and BHCs increased their capital ratios. 8, 9 The purpose of this paper is to evaluate what the stress tests did that the Basel ratios did not do, and to examine whether stress tests are likely to serve a similar purpose in the future.
The next subsection begins this analysis by providing a brief historical summary of capital regulation to set the stage. The third section explains why the Basel ratios were not enough and how stress tests addressed Basel's inadequacy. The fourth section examines the likelihood that stress tests will be called upon to perform a similar role in the future. The last section provides some concluding remarks.
A brief history of capital regulation
Bank supervisors have long use ratios to evaluate the capital adequacy of their banks. 10 In the United States after World War II, the federal bank regulatory agencies did not issue regulations setting minimum capital requirements but rather used a variety of ratios as a part of the supervisory process. However, Marcus 11 argues that absent minimum regulatory requirements the supervisors used these ratios to judge banking organizations against their peers.
As a consequence, although U.S. supervision generally succeeded in keeping individual banking organizations from reducing their capital ratios below their peers, it was ineffective in preventing widespread declines in capital ratios. In response to these declines, the U.S. entered the modern era of capital regulation by adopting numeric requirements based on a simple leverage ratio in 1981. 12 However, the U.S. measure which equally weighted assets was, in the words of Kapstein, 13 "hopelessly simplistic" relative to several other G-10 countries including Belgium, France and Germany.
This section provides a brief summary of the procedures followed to measure capital adequacy in the Basel ratios and stress tests.
Basel Capital Accords
The first step towards Basel I standards came as U.S. supervisors noted the weaknesses in the leverage ratio and started looking at the more risk sensitive measures used in several G-10 countries. The U.S. then worked on its own and in coordination with increasing numbers of supervisors in other developed countries to reach agreement on a common capital standard. estimates of the probability of default (PD) for each asset class and enter this into supervisory formulas to obtain the risk weight. The advanced IRB expands the set of parameters estimated by the bank to include not only probability of default, but also exposure at default (EAD), loss given default (LGD) and effective maturity (M). The supervisors would then supply a formula including an assumed loss correlation to risk weight each exposure. Banks that wanted to use either of the IRB approaches were required to obtain prior supervisory approval of their models for estimating the parameters. 
Brief history of Stress testing
Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) 18 describes stress testing as "generic term describing various techniques used by financial firms to gauge their potential vulnerability to exceptional but plausible events." Stress testing was incorporated into the market risk amendment to Basel I with the BCBS 19 requirement that firms using internal models must have a "rigorous and comprehensive stress testing program" for the risks in their trading books. CGFS followed this up with two subsequent surveys CFGS . 20, 21 These surveys by CFGS found that large banks were conducting their own stress tests but that these tests were largely limited to the banks' trading books.
Supervisory stress tests in the United States
The held to maturity (HTM) securities portfolios and (d) in some cases the losses in their trading portfolios. These estimates were then subject to review and revision by the supervisors using newly developed supervisory models.
The BHCs subject to SCAP were expected to maintain capital levels in excess of regulatory requirements at the end of the eight quarter horizon. Those BHCs that fell short of this standard were required to issue new capital; they could not meet the standards by shrinking their portfolios. The result of the exercise was that 10 of the 19 BHCs needed to raise an aggregate of $185 billion in Tier 1 common capital. 25 These 10 BHCs were given an opportunity to do so in private markets, but those that did not raise the funds privately were required to accept a capital injection by the U.S. government through the Capital Purchase 33 The set of BHCs subject to mandatory stress testing and capital planning was expanded in 2012 to include all domestically owned BHCs with assets greater than $50 billion. However, these additional nine BHCs were analyzed under a less rigorous Capital Plan Review or CapPR because these BHCs were smaller and lacked the stress testing experience of the larger CCAR BHCs. 34 Also, in 2012 the Federal Reserve formalized its guidance in the form of revisions to Regulation YY. 35 Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act has made stress testing a permanent part of the supervisory evaluation of large bank's capital adequacy. Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank requires the Board of Governors to conduct annual stress tests with three sets of scenarios (baseline, adverse and severely adverse). Additionally large BHCs are required to conduct their own semiannual stress tests.
European Union Experience
Many European countries also ran a stress test in 2009 using a common scenario and guidelines developed by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS). However, the CEBS 36 announcement of the test explicitly stated that the evaluation of banks' capital adequacy remained the province of national supervisors and this test was only intended to assess the resilience of the European financial system. The subsequent announcement of the results by CEBS 37 only provided overall results for the sample of 22 major banking but it also stated that no bank would see its Tier 1 ratio fall under 6% under the adverse scenario.
The following year, CEBS conducted another EU wide stress test where individual bank results were released. The 2010 stress test was expanded to 91 European banks with only seven of these banks failing to pass the test and these seven banks were expected to raise only €3.5
billion. 38 However, one of the key stresses facing European banks in 2010, the threat of a sovereign default, was deliberately understated by the structure of the tests which required banks to recognize potential losses on bonds in their trading books but not in their banking book.
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Four months after the announcement of the results of the 2010 CEBS stress test, Allied Irish
Banks and Bank of Ireland failed even though both had passed the stress test. 40 Their failure also raised doubts as to whether the stress scenarios were sufficiently stressful.
The 2011 European stress tests were conducted by CEBS successor, the European Banking Authority (EBA). 41 The EBA stress tests were similarly limited in their treatment of sovereign debt, suffered from other problems 42, 43 and again found relatively few banks (8) needing to raise a relatively small amount of capital (€3.5 billion). However, the EBA enhanced transparency by providing information on exposures by asset class and geography in the form of a spreadsheet. Thus, analysts could and many did, conduct their own version of the stress tests using their preferred loss assumptions. 
Why Basel was not enough and how that lead to adoption of stress tests
Basel II in particular is supposed to provide a 99.9% level of confidence at an annual level, that is that a bank will suffer losses in excess of its tier 1 and tier 2 capital only once in a thousand years. Such a 1000 year period would seem to capture even the "severely adverse" scenario used in the U.S. SCAP. Yet, the U.S. supervisors turned to SCAP rather than rely on Basel I or force its large commercial banks to immediately adopt Basel II. In order to understand why Basel was not enough and why stress tests were needed, one has to look at the construction of the two measures. The next two subsection examine each of the two measures in greater detail. The third section uses these details to explain what the stress tests did that the Basel ratios could not do.
Basel ratios
Despite their may differences, all versions of the Basel Capital ratios can be described as being unconditional static measures of capital adequacy with the risk adjustment occurring in the denominator (risk-weighted assets). The Basel ratios are static, unconditional measures in that they measure capital adequacy at a single point in time using a process to calculate the ratios that does not depend upon the expected future state of the economy. The Basel ratios use historical data to estimate the bank specific distribution of losses associated with various asset categories.
These distributions are then used to estimate expected losses in the lower tail of the distribution. 45 The current portfolio positions are then summed using weights derived from the expected losses to calculate the denominator of the Basel ratios.
The Basel ratios rely on the denominator for risk adjustment with the calculation of the measure of capital (the numerator) being relatively mechanical. The Basel capital accords provide definitions of the items to include in tier 1 capital (such as common equity and retained earnings) and to include in tier 2 capital (such as subordinated debt). The accords also provide for certain deductions from tier 1 capital (such as for certain intangible assets) and tier 2 capital (such as deductions to subordinated debt as it approaches maturity). However, the values of each of the items included in capital are taken directly from each bank's financial statements and hence are measured in a process that is independent of the process for calculating the Basel capital ratios.
Stress tests
In contrast, the stress tests are conditional dynamic measures with the risk adjustment occurring in the numerator (capital). A bank's stress tests begin with whatever ratio(s) are being used by its supervisor, which is to say that all of the EU and U.S. supervisory stress tests have begun with one or more of the Basel ratios. The stress test then becomes dynamic in that it measures the capital ratios at various points in time throughout the scenario. It is conditional in that the result of each stress test is conditional on an economic scenario specified prior to the start of the stress test.
The primary goal of a stress test is to project the capital ratios at the end of one or more periods. The EU and U.S. stress tests to date have focused on regulatory measures of capital which implicitly requires estimates of changes in the financial accounting value of capital given a specific scenario. In order to do so, scenario dependent estimates are needed of the financial accounting (or book) value of each bank's pre-provision net revenue (PPNR), its losses during the scenario, and planned capital distributions. The first step is to develop an economic scenario containing the paths of key economic variables over the stress test horizon. Examples of such variables include unemployment, GDP growth rate and housing prices. Next, historic data are used to estimate models of the sensitivity of PPNR and of the losses in various parts of the portfolio to the economic variables in the scenario. Finally, the stress scenario and characteristics of the bank's portfolio are fed into the estimated models to project PPNR and losses. The projected losses and projected capital distribution are subtracted from PPNR to estimate each period's change in capital. 46 The capital at the end of each period is then its value at the start of the next period.
Comparison of measures
The stress tests start with one or more of the Basel ratios, thus if Basel was not enough, the benefit of stress tests must lie in something stress tests do that the Basel ratios do not. The above discussion suggests two not mutually exclusive candidates for this something: (a) Basel relies on historic risk distributions whereas the stress tests use forward looking scenarios, and (b)
Basel accepts accounting measures of capital whereas the stress tests allow capital to move up or down in response to the stress scenario.
Although the Basel' measures seek to provide enough capital to cover all but a one in a thousand year scenario, it relies on a combination of statistics and relatively recent history to determine how big the losses could be over the next one thousand years. If economic conditions have been relatively benign, as happened in the "Great Moderation," statistical measures estimated from these data will predict that the one in a thousand year estimated losses are not going to be very large.
Supervisory stress tests, however, allow the supervisors to specify the conditions against which the banks' capital positions will be tested. This allows the supervisors to construct stress scenarios that are not in the recent data and may not have been observed for decades such as a prolonged nationwide decrease in housing prices. Thus, it is plausible that the reason the Basel ratios were not enough is that despite its seemingly extremely high standards, that in practice it underestimated banks' risk exposure and, hence, their capital needs.
While underestimation of risk exposure may have been a contributory factor, it is not obvious that the severely adverse scenario in SCAP was as adverse as the scenarios that concerned investors. Indeed, Berner, Graseck and Tirupattur 47 state that "The SCAP economic assumptions are realistic, but not especially adverse, in our view."
The other possibility is that the Basel ratios problem was their reliance on accounting measures of capital which might embed unrecognized losses in asset values. Although the stress tests as currently implemented also rely on accounting measures of capital, the longer time horizon of the stress tests can force a bank to eventually recognize its losses.
Bank asset values around the time of the stress tests were criticized as not fully reflecting losses in security valuations (such as not marking to market holdings in subprime mortgage backed securities and in collateralized debt obligations) or in their loan portfolios. The accounting standards at the time permitted banks to combine their own models with market inputs to estimate the price of an illiquid security (level 2) or even combine their models with at least some inputs reflecting management judgment (level 3). Some investors criticized level 3 valuations as not being "mark to market" but rather as being "mark to myth." Additionally, accounting standards required that a loss be "probable" based on events that have occurred up to the date of the statements before a lender could recognize a loan loss. The term "probable" is not well defined in the accounting standards, but Traub 48 says that in practice "probable" was taken to mean an approximately 75 to 80 percent probability of loss.
Stress tests that are sufficiently long and stressful can "smoke out" losses that banks
would not (and in the case of loan losses often could not) recognize in their current financial statements. As a result, stress tests could give investors a clearer picture of a bank's current condition and give supervisors a better idea how much more capital a bank needed to replace its recent losses.
The extent to which investors discounted banks' reported equity values may be seen by comparing the bank's capital ratios using book values with those calculated using market values of equity. Furlong 49 and Haldane 50 compared these two ratios and both found that capital ratios were generally far lower when measured with market values of equity.
Thus, theory provides two reasons why Basel was not enough. Evidence from that period provides strong support for the hypothesis that the Basel ratios relied on inflated estimates of capital. In contrast, the evidence suggests that even the severely adverse stress scenario tested by the U.S. was not at the low end of investors' expectations for the economy and, hence, that stress tests relative advantage in measuring risk was at most a secondary factor in their success.
Will the Basel ratios remain inadequate and stress tests an appropriate fix?
Stress tests proved valuable in resolving the last crisis in the U.S., but will they prove equally valuable in the next crisis? While the definitive answer will have to wait until the next crisis, there are a couple of reasons to think that the stress tests will not be as valuable. One for the rest of the developed countries. Although the approaches taken by FASB and IASB are somewhat different, at least FASB's proposal would require far earlier recognition of credit losses than is the case under the current "probable" standard. 51, 52 To be sure, neither FASB's nor IASB's proposed changes would necessarily force banks to always make timely provision for deterioration in the value of their assets. Financial statements remain management's representation of the issuer's financial condition, with the result that the estimates of loan losses will continue to be based on management's judgments. Moreover, these changes relate exclusively to credit losses and will not address potential losses due to interest rate changes in the value of the loan portfolio. Nevertheless, the combination of changes in the calculation of the Basel ratios and the measurement of equity for financial accounting will likely reduce the value added of conducting stress tests in the next crisis.
Moreover, the effectiveness of stress tests is conditional upon the use of discretion by the supervisors in selecting the stress scenario. While stress tests can be designed to force recognition of economic losses, the EU experience show that stress tests can also be designed to avoid recognizing such losses. Thus, in order to evaluate the likely value added of stress tests in a future crisis, one needs to understand supervisory incentives when selecting the stress scenario.
A comparison of the U.S. SCAP and CEBS 2011 stress tests highlights some of the more important supervisory incentives.
In formulating its stress scenario, the U.S. was in an almost ideal circumstance for effective use of a stress test to strengthen its financial system. The ability of the stress test to undermine confidence in U.S. banks was limited given that the runs after Lehman's failure in late 2008 had demonstrated that market participants lacked confidence in reported capital ratios. willing to risk the possibility of undermining market confidence in some large banks on the basis of a stress scenario that might not happen? Of course, we will never know the answer to this counterfactual. However, one can say that it would take a brave supervisor to run such a risk, even if the supervisor had access to funds for a public recapitalization of undercapitalized banks or a credible resolution mechanism for banks that were run (neither of which existed in March 2008).
Conclusion
The Basel ratios failed to maintain investor confidence during the recent financial crisis.
Although Basel II underestimated some risks, the bigger problem with the Basel II appears to have been largely lack of market confidence in asset valuations. Largely in response to this lack of confidence, the U.S. and the EU implemented stress tests. The U.S. supervisors had almost ideal incentives to run effective stress tests and the U.S. stress tests did help in restoring confidence. Many EU supervisors had strong incentives to avoid fully recognizing losses and as a result some large EU banks failed within months of having successfully passed their stress tests.
In response to the crisis, both bank supervisors and accounting standards setters have sought to address some of the flaws in Basel II. While these efforts are unlikely to completely solve the problems, they are likely to result in the supervisory capital ratios that more accurately reflect the true economic condition of the banks. Moreover, the conditions that contributed to the success of the U.S. stress tests may not be repeated in the next crisis, and anyway few would care to repeat the conditions leading up to the U.S. stress test. This suggests that if the stress tests are to justify the amount of resources currently required, at least in the amount of resources invested by the U.S., that these tests must also serve some other functions. A companion piece discusses some of these functions. 53 
